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Abstract
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian provided a neutrality
result for the private provision of public goods that
has inspired a considerable literature. The result has
significant implications for income redistribution and
broader policy interventions. This paper reviews the basic
result and its applications, and discusses extensions to
general private provision economies.
1 | INTRODUCTION
A surprising result in the analysis of private contributions to a public good is that the total level
of provision is unaffected by any reallocation of income among consumers that leaves the set of
contributors (those giving some positive amount) unchanged. This neutrality result was first
established by Warr (1983) and extended by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), henceforth
BBV. That a transfer of income between consumers induces those receiving income to raise
their contributions to the public good, and that this increase is offset by a reduction in
contributions of those losing income, is unremarkable. What is striking is that the exactly
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offsetting nature of the change in contributions is not special to particular utility functions but
is a general consequence of the individual rationality conditions for the Nash equilibrium of the
contribution game. Since the publication of BBV, the analysis has been extended to models with
multiple private and public goods with the aim of identifying those redistributions of
endowment, within a variety of situations, that leave the private provision equilibrium
unchanged. Although the focus of this paper is upon the implications of the BBV neutrality
result and its extensions, we should note, before proceeding, that the publication of BBV
inspired a much broader literature on private provision. Some of the theoretical applications of
BBV are noted below, whereas Muñoz‐Herrera and Nikiforakis (2019) provide an extensive
review of experimental investigations.
When a model is constructed to analyze an economic issue, several factors are important: the
concept of equilibrium adopted, the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, and the comparative
statics of policy interventions. The insightful approach of BBV fully explored all these aspects for the
scenario in which a private good can either be consumed or contributed to public good provision.
To be precise, in contrast to a personalized pricing scheme, BBV analyzed a game‐theoretic model
in which the strategy of each player was their voluntary contribution to the provision of a public
good. For this noncooperative model of public good provision, the proof of existence of a Nash
equilibrium was reinforced by the description of sufficient conditions to obtain uniqueness (see also
Bergstrom, Blume, & Varian, 1992; Fraser, 1992) confirming that there was no way to escape from
the neutrality through appeal to multiple equilibria. In addition, to analyze the extent to which
government provision of a public good impacts on private contributions, BBV also provided a
comprehensive characterization of the comparative statics of redistributive policy.
An earlier literature (Chamberlin, 1974, 1976; McGuire, 1974; Young, 1982) had demonstrated
the inefficiency of the private provision equilibrium and (inconclusively) discussed the consequence
of changing the number of potential contributors upon the degree of efficiency. The publication of
BBV sparked fresh research into private provision due to the generality of their neutrality result and
its obvious implications for redistributive policies. The work of BBV also motivated research into
what have since then become known as “aggregate games” because the neutrality result is a
consequence of the equilibrium level of public good provision being a function of aggregate income.
In fact, the neutrality result can be obtained as a special case of a more general theorem that
characterizes when Nash equilibria are independent of the distribution of agents’ characteristics
(see Bergstrom & Varian, 1985). A detailed analysis of public good provision from the aggregate
game perspective is provided in Cornes and Hartley (2005). A more recent line of research,
exemplified by Allouch and King (2019), has extended the BBV model to public good provision
within networks that have local interaction between contributors.
The private provision model has found useful applications in a very wide range of contexts. As
examples, it has formed the basis for understanding noncooperative behavior in the household
(Lundberg & Pollak, 1994) and as the basis of the threat point in bargaining models of the household
(Lundberg & Pollak, 1996). It is also one of the limit points of the semi‐cooperative household model
of d’Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2019). The contributions of different nations to military
coalitions have been modeled as contributions to a public good (Sandler & Hartley, 2001). The model
has been applied in environmental economics to analyze green markets (Kotchen, 2006) and global
environmental problems (Buchholz & Konrad, 1994; Murdoch & Sandler, 1997). Johnson (2004) used
the model to study open source software and Lévy‐Garboua, Montmarquette, Vaksmann, and Villeval
(2017) to model contributions to a voluntary mutual insurance pool. This is only a small sample of the
very many applications.
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It is our aim in this paper to report and discuss the neutrality results that have followed
the publication of BBV’s pioneering article. The model of BBV not only brought strategic
behavior in public good provision to the forefront of public economic theory, but it also
raised a variety of challenges that motivated many further research articles. In our
discussion, we specify the crucial assumptions upon which the various neutrality results
rely and therefore highlight the conditions on the primitives that provide an explanation for
their failure. In particular, the consideration of multiple private and public goods allows the
implications of relative price changes to be investigated. Moreover, further extensions and
generalizations of the work by BBV lead us to other considerations, including altruistic
behavior and its effect on neutrality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe a general
private provision economy with multiple private and public goods. In Section 3 we simplify the
economy to a single public good to prove a version of the BBV neutrality result and to discuss
some significant implications of that result. Section 4 summarizes and compares different
neutrality results for economies with multiple public goods. Altruism and neutrality are
considered in Section 5. In Section 6, we conclude with a few final remarks.
2 | PRIVATE PROVISION ECONOMY
We begin by describing a very general model of an economy with private provision based on the
papers by Faias, Moreno‐García, and Wooders (2014, 2015). Consider an economy with a finite
set of private commodities that can be used either for consumption or as inputs into the
production of public goods. The economy has a finite number of firms which are characterized
by technologies for producing public goods, and a finite number of consumers who are
endowed with private goods, have preferences over the consumption of private and public
goods, and share the potential profits of firms.
To be precise, let ? be an economy with a finite number ℓ of private goods and a finite
number k of public goods. There is a finite set n= {1, …, }? of consumers and a finite set
k= {1, …, }? of firms. Each consumer i ?∈ is characterized by her endowment of private goods
ei ++IR∈ ℓ , and by her preference relation over the commodity space k++IRℓ , represented by a
continuous, concave, and monotone‐increasing utility function U :i k++ +IR IR→ℓ . Define the
aggregate endowment by e ei
n
i=1≡ ∑ .
A firm h ?∈ produces public good h by means of a technology that is described by a
production function F :h + +IR IR→ℓ , converting private goods into that firm’s public good. We
assume that each Fh is continuous and concave. Each consumer i ?∈ receives a share δ 0ih ≥ of
firm h’s profit and δ = 1in ih=1∑ for each h. A price system is a vector p q( , ) k++IR∈ ℓ , where
p p j= ( , = 1, …, )j ℓ denotes the vector of prices for the ℓ private commodities and
q q h k= ( , = 1, …, )h denotes the vector of prices for the k public goods.
Given a price system p q( , ) k++IR∈ ℓ , each firm h ?∈ chooses the vector of inputs in +IRℓ that
maximizes its profits y q F y p yΠ ( ) ( ) −h h h≡ ⋅ ⋅ . Given a price system p q( , ) k++IR∈ ℓ and profitsΠh
for each firm h, each consumer i ?∈ chooses private goods consumption and voluntary
contributions to public good provision. Each consumer takes as given the contributions of the
other consumers to public goods. That is, given a vector g j j i( , , )j ?∈ ≠ of voluntary
contributions, each consumer i solves the problem:
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where g = ϱi j j in j− =1,∑ ≠ .
Definition A private provision equilibrium for the economy ? is a price system p q( , ), a
vector of inputs y y h k= ( ; = 1, …, )h +IR∈ ℓ for firms, an allocation of private
commodities x x i n= ( ; = 1, …, )i +IR∈ ℓ , and an assignment of voluntary contributions
g h k gϱ = ( ; = 1, …, ) =in i h=1 +IR∑ ∈ such that
(i) x( , ϱ )i i solves the optimization problem of consumer i for every i ;?∈
(ii) yh maximizes firm h’s profit, for every h ;?∈
(iii) x y e+ ;i
n
i h
k
h i
n
i=1 =1 =1∑ ∑ ≤ ∑
(iv) g F y( )h h h≤ for every public good h.
An existence result for this equilibrium can be found in Faias et al. (2014). The proof of
existence is based on an adaptation of the Shapley–Shubik market game with a continuum of
players (consumers and firms) which has the property that the strategic Nash equilibria of the
market game induce a private provision equilibrium of the original finite economy. For the
purpose of that proof, the technologies of the firms are assumed to exhibit constant returns to
scale.1
3 | NEUTRALITY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
By reducing the economy of Section 2 to a single public good and a single private good, the
model includes as a particular case the one formulated by Bergstrom et al. (1986). BBV provided
a theorem that generalized Warr’s (1983) neutrality result and relied only on properties
resulting from optimization by individual agents without recourse to first‐order conditions. BBV
identified the property required for a redistribution of endowments to define a perturbed
economy with an equilibrium in which all consumers had the same private goods allocation as
before the redistribution and the total public good contribution was unchanged. To be precise,
the income redistributions that guarantee neutrality are those made among contributors and
leave contributors able to afford their original equilibrium private good allocation. This
condition is analogous to that required for the demonstration of Ricardian equivalence. This is
because of the shared underlying logic that individuals find it optimal to make behavioral
changes that undo government intervention.
We now prove a variant of the BBV neutrality results for a private provision economy with a
single public good but multiple private goods. The single firm producing the public good is
labeled h = 1. Define the wealth of consumer i by w p e δ+ Πi i i1 1≡ ⋅ , where the public good is
1We remark that Florenzano (2009) considers a model with externalities that are more general than all of those cited in this manuscript. Among further
additional results, she shows the existence of a variety of equilibria (see also Florenzano, 2003).
288 | FAIAS ET AL.
chosen as numeraire so that its unit price q = 1. The optimization for consumer i can therefore
be written as
U x gmax ( , )
x g
i i
i
( , ) ×i i + +IR IR∈ ℓ
subject to
p x g w g+ + ,i i i i−⋅ ≤
g g .i i−≥
The second constraint reflects the fact that the contribution of i to the public good, g gϱ = −i i i− ,
must be nonnegative.
From the optimization we obtain the demand function for the public good
g ζ w g g= max{ ( + ), }.i i i i i− −
The demand for the public good is assumed to be normal. This assumption is adopted to ensure
that the inverse of the demand function can be used in the proof of neutrality below. Neutrality
can be established without this assumption but uniqueness cannot.
Assumption SI. The public good is normal: ζ w g( + )i i i− is strictly increasing in
w g+i i− .
The important distinction for the analysis of neutrality is between consumers who contribute
to the public good and those who do not. This is because the subsequent focus is upon
redistribution of income among contributors.
Definition Given an income distribution w i{ , }i ?∈ , consumer i is a contributor at the
private provision equilibrium if g g>i i− , otherwise consumer i is a noncontributor.
The set of contributors is denoted by Γ, where Γ ?⊆ , and γ#Γ = . Similarly, the set of
noncontributors is denoted by Ξ, where Ξ Γ?≡ ∕ .
Neutrality refers to the fact that the equilibrium does not change when income is
redistributed. To make this statement precise it is necessary to have a formal statement of
redistribution. The definition below allows both endowments and profit shares to be
redistributed between consumers. The key features of the redistribution are that no consumer
is driven to negative wealth and that no resources are lost during the process of
redistribution.
Definition A redistribution among the set R ?⊆ is a vector
r e δ r i R= (ˆ , ˆ ), × , ,i i1 IR IR∈ ∈ℓ
such that e e e δ δ0 + ˆ , ˆ = 0, 0 + ˆ 1i i i R i i i1
1≤ ∑ ≤ ≤∈ , and δˆ = 0i R i
1∑∈ .
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Denote the vector of wealth before a redistribution r by w i R( ˜ , )i ∈ , and the vector after
the redistribution by w i R( ¯ , )i ∈ , where
w p e δ˜ = + Π ,i i i1 1⋅
and
w p e e δ δ¯ = [ + ˆ ] + [ + ˆ ]Π .i i i i i1 1 1⋅
Observe that no resources are lost by redistribution since
w p e δ p e δ w¯ = ( + Π ) + ( ˆ + ˆ Π ) = ˜ .
i R
i
i R
i i
i R
i i
i R
i
1
1
1
1∑ ∑ ∑ ∑⋅ ⋅
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
Similarly, denote the private provision equilibrium before a redistribution r by
x i g( , , )i ?∈ ͠͠ and the equilibrium after the redistribution by x i g( ¯ , , )̄i ?∈ . Finally, it is
necessary to define what is meant by a neutral redistribution.
Definition A redistribution is neutral if x x ī =i i ?∀ ∈͠ and g ḡ = ͠ .
Our version of the neutrality result of BBV can now be stated.
Theorem 1. A redistribution r among the set of contributors, Γ, that satisfy
p e δ g g iˆ + ˆ Π < − Γi i i i1 1 −⋅ ∀ ∈ is neutral.
Proof. At the private provision equilibrium g g i= Γi ∀ ∈ and g ζ w g= ( + )i i i− . Under
assumption SI, ζ g( )i−1 exists, so we can write w g ζ g+ = ( )i i i− −1 . From the definition of
g w g w γ g, ( + ) = + ( − 1)i i i i i i− Γ − Γ∑ ∑∈ ∈ . The equilibrium value of g is therefore the
solution to w γ g ζ g+ ( − 1) = ( )i i i iΓ Γ −1∑ ∑∈ ∈ . Since w w̄ = ˜i i i iΓ Γ∑ ∑∈ ∈ we have g ḡ = ˜.
The identity g ḡ = ˜ implies that ζ w g ζ w g( ̄ + ̄ ) = ( ˜ + ˜ )i i i i i i− − and hence from the individual
budget constraints that x x̄ =i i͠ . □
Clearly, it is necessary that the redistribution is conducted within the set of contributors.
Any noncontributor involved in a redistribution will change their demand for the private goods
and neutrality will fail. Similarly, if the redistribution causes one or more contributors to
become noncontributors then their level of private consumption will not be sustainable and
neutrality will fail. Hence, it is critical that the redistribution involves only contributors and
does not change the set of contributors.
It was noted by Warr (1983) that the levels of private consumption are also unaffected by
redistribution of income. Itaya, de Meza, and Myles (1997) used this result to show that if the
consumers have the same preferences, the level of private consumption must be identical for all
contributors to the public good. Consequently, since the level of public good is by definition the
same for all contributors, there must be equalization of utilities. Hence, income distribution
(within a range) is irrelevant for the distribution of utility. The equalization of utility and the
independence of total public good provision from the distribution of income derive from the
private provision economy being an aggregate game where the key statistic is total income in
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society.2 From this follows the additional implication that an extra dollar of income for
contributor i raises i’s utility by the same amount as an extra dollar to contributor j raises i’s
utility. That is, contributors are indifferent as to who should receive any extra income that
society may generate.
To prove these statements we now assume:
Assumption IU. For all i U x g U x g, ( , ) = ( , )i i i?∈ .
Under Assumption IU the demand function for the public good is given by
g ζ w g g= max{ ( + ), }i i i i− − for all i ?∈ , and for the set of contributors w g ζ g+ = ( )i i− −1 . Since
g g= − ϱi i− we have w ζ g gϱ = − ( ) +i i −1 . Let w ζ g g= ( ) +* −1 . Clearly, ϱ > 0i if w w> *i andϱ = 0i if w w*i ≤ , so w* is the minimum income required to choose to be a contributor.
We can prove the following:
Theorem 2. Under Assumption IU, at the private provision equilibrium: (a) x x i=i ∀
with w w*i ≥ and (b) U x g U i( , ) =i Γ ∀ with w w*i ≥ , and U x g U i( , ) <i Γ ∀ with
w w< *i .
Proof. Take any k l, Γ∈ . Then w ζ g g w ζ g gϱ − ϱ = [ − ( ) + ] − [ − ( ) + ]k l k l−1 −1
w w= −k l. Evaluating the budget constraints at the equilibrium, p x g w g+ = +k k k−⋅ and
p x g w g+ = +l l l−⋅ so that p x p x w g w g w w− = [ + ] − [ + ] = [ − ] − [ϱk l k k l l k l k− −⋅ ⋅
−ϱ ] = 0l . Given Assumption IU, it follows x x=k l. Since k and l were arbitrarily chosen
this is true for all i with w w> *i . It holds for w w= *i by continuity. Given (a), (b) follows
immediately. □
Observe that if all private goods are normal, then it follows that x x i<i ∀ with w w< *i .
With a single private good, this is true directly from the budget constraint. The content of this
theorem is that the consumption levels, and the utilities, of all contributors are equalized at the
private provision equilibrium. This occurs despite potential inequality in the distribution of
income. Noncontributors by definition have a lower utility level.
The result that utilities are equalized seems to suggest that as long as the social welfare
function is symmetric and concave in utilities, income redistribution is redundant as a tool of
economic policy. This is not the entirely the case for two reasons. First, the neutrality result
only applies to redistribution between contributors. Different issues arise when noncon-
tributors are affected by redistribution. Second, neutrality only applies to redistributions that
do not change the set of contributors. For more general redistributions, Itaya et al. (1997)
proved that social welfare is not a concave function of income, with the nonconcavity caused
by changes in the set of contributors. In particular, a welfare increase necessarily arises if a
small transfer is made such that the consumer from whom income is taken just ceases
contributing to the public good. The policy implication of this result is that a uniform
distribution of income does not maximize social welfare. To maximize welfare it is always
necessary to have sufficient inequality to ensure that some consumers lack the income to
contribute to the public good.
2Recall that in the proof of Theorem 1 the equilibrium of provision is the solution to w γ g ζ g+ ( − 1) = ( )i i i iΓ Γ −1∑ ∑∈ ∈ , so g necessarily depends on wi iΓ∑ ∈ .
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An even more surprising result emerges when noncontributors are involved in the
redistribution. Cornes and Sandler (2000) showed that when there are three or more consumers
a redistribution of income from noncontributors to contributors can be a Pareto improvement.
To see how this works, assume there are three consumers and that only one of them contributes
to the public good. Now transfer $1 from each of the noncontributors to the contributor. The
income of the contributor has risen by $2 so, if the public good is normal, the level of
contribution will increase. If the increased contribution has value greater than $1 to each of the
noncontributors, a Pareto improvement has been realized. Notice that the transfers require
collective action to be effective, and that it becomes easier to generate a Pareto improvement as
the number of noncontributors rises. This result should be considered alongside the
demonstration by Andreoni (1988) that when the number of potential contributors is large,
only the richest consumer contributes and, in a slightly different model, by Fries, Golding, and
Romano (1991) that in a large but finite economy only one type will contribute. This creates
precisely the conditions under which an inequality‐increasing redistribution will be a Pareto
improvement. A related result is demonstrated by Varian (1994) who shows (with two
contributors) that a Pareto improvement can be obtained if each contributor subsidizes the cost
of provision for the other. This is because the cost of the induced extra provision of public good
is equal to the subsidy. If the size of the subsidies is chosen optimally, then a Lindahl
equilibrium is obtained. In a similar vein, Liu (2019) demonstrates that small matching grants
will always secure a Pareto improvement if all consumers are contributors and may secure an
improvement when there are some noncontributors.
Building on these contributions, the impact of private provision on measured inequality has
been explored by Dasgupta and Kanbur (2011). They show that private provision increases the
absolute difference in real income between any two noncontributors relative to the difference in
nominal incomes. If the noncontributors are sufficiently poorer than the contributors, or if the
contributors are sufficiently numerous, the gap between contributors and noncontributors
increases as well. Private provision therefore increases inequality if an absolute measure is used,
and may increase a relative measure.
These observations about the potential benefits of inequality carry implications for the
design of tax instruments and institutions. Itaya, de Meza, and Myles (2002) explore optimal
income and commodity taxes when there is private provision. The nonconcavity in the social
welfare function implies that standard results do not extend to this setting since some inequality
is always desirable even when lump‐sum taxes are available. The structure of the optimal tax
system depends on the extent of “see‐through”: The degree to which the consumers
comprehend the link between government revenue and government public good provision.
With see‐through there is neutrality with respect to any taxes that fall only upon contributors—
a conclusion based again on the observation that consumers find it rational to react in a manner
that neutralizes the government intervention. Olszewski and Rosenthal (2004) analyze
alternative political institutions for choosing the marginal rate of a proportional income tax.
They show that many institutions (including majority voting and Leviathan government)
deliver a Pareto improvement over nonintervention unless the society has a small number of
members and there is considerable inequality in the initial distribution. Uler (2008)
demonstrates that the level of private provision increases with the tax rate when contributions
are tax deductible and that in a society that uses the tax system to ensure perfect equality the
public good is provided efficiently.
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4 | EXTENSIONS
There is no unique extension of BBV’s model to more general settings since alternative choices
can be made about the nature of production technology and the form of redistribution. As a
consequence, the study of neutrality for economies with multiple private and public goods is
not an easy task. In this section we aim to summarize and compare some generalizations of the
neutrality result and explore further implications of income redistribution.
We observe that BBV’s model ruled out relative price changes since it had a single private
good and a linear production technology for the public good. This is in contrast to the general
model of Section 2 in which redistribution involving noncontributors can affect the demand for
private goods and impact on relative prices. We also observe that when the technologies of the
firms exhibit constant returns to scale the distribution of firms’ profits among shareholders has
no impact on the equilibrium outcome since profit is zero in equilibrium. This is not the case
when nonlinear technologies are considered for the production of public goods. To illustrate the
consequence of relative price changes, we state a (partial) neutrality result for redistribution
among the noncontributors in the BBV model and then contrast this with the potential
outcomes in more general models.
Consider the BBV model with a single private good ( = 1ℓ ), a single public good (k = 1), and
a linear production technology allowing units to be chosen so that p q= = 1. Since the
production technology is linear, we have Π = 01 . Define w ζ g g= ( ) +*i i−1 as the minimum
income required for i to become a contributor. Wealth before the redistribution r is w i R( ˜ , )i ∈ ,
and after the redistribution is w i R( ¯ , )i ∈ . These wealth levels generate corresponding equilibria
x i g( , , )i ?∈ ͠͠ and x i g( ¯ , , )̄i ?∈ . The definition of partial neutrality can now be given.
Definition A redistribution is partially neutral if g ḡ = ͠ .
It is now possible to state a partial neutrality result for redistribution among
noncontributors.
Theorem 3. In the BBV model, a redistribution r among the set of noncontributors, Ξ,
that satisfies e w wˆ < −*i i i i Ξ∀ ∈ is partially neutral.
Proof. The redistribution does not change the set of contributors, nor does it affect the
existing contributors. Hence, w w̄ = ˜i i i iΓ Γ∑ ∑∈ ∈ which implies g ḡ = ˜. □
Redistribution among the noncontributors cannot be neutral because it will affect the
consumption of private good by noncontributors. Each noncontributor will increase (or decrease)
consumption of the private good exactly by the size of the change in income caused by the
redistribution. Total demand for the private good is unchanged and there is no impact on the
contributors. Noting this, the consequence of having many private goods can now be explored.
Redistribution among the noncontributors will raise the income of some, and reduce the income of
others. Except in very special cases, these income effects will cause changes in the aggregate
demand for private goods and consequent changes in equilibrium relative prices. The relative price
changes will also affect the contributors to the public good. Although their endowments have not
changed, the relative price changes can affect the real incomes of contributors. This will impact on
private consumption and contribution to the public good.
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These observations about relative price changes are formalized in a series of papers by
Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005, 2006, 2007). They consider an economy with several private
goods and a finite set of firms producing one public good, which is privately financed, with
nonlinear production technologies described by strictly concave transformation functions.
Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2006) show that an increase in the quantity of public good
provided through a redistribution involving contributors and noncontributors does not imply a
Pareto improvement. Reciprocally, a Pareto improvement need not require an increase in the
public good level. They also show that there exists a generic set of economies for which a
government intervention—the tax‐financed purchase of private goods to use as inputs to public
good production—Pareto‐improves upon the equilibrium outcome in which there is only
private provision of the public good. In the BBV model with a single private good and a single
public good, this intervention would not affect the equilibrium level of public good. With many
private goods, the change in private good use caused by government purchases for public good
production can affect relative prices and, hence, generate nonneutrality. In this way, a
nonneutrality result in terms of utility levels that involves an intervention policy beyond
redistribution of endowments or incomes is obtained.
On the other hand, Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2007) demonstrate an extension of the
neutrality result of BBV to the case of many private goods by considering a redistribution of the
numeraire commodity among the contributors. Consequently, this confirms that for a
redistribution of the numeraire commodity to be nonneutral, the participation of noncon-
tributors in the redistribution is required. For those cases of nonneutrality, Villanacci and
Zenginobuz (2007) show that no clear conclusion concerning the impact of redistribution on
the level of public good is possible with multiple private commodities: redistribution between
contributors and noncontributors can increase or decrease the equilibrium level of public good.
This result is also driven by relative price changes since, in the BBV model with one private
good, redistribution from a noncontributor to a contributor will increase the level of public
good.
A different approach has been explored by Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2012) who introduce
a nonprofit firm that has the aim of maximizing the amount of public good produced, and
whose costs are financed by the total voluntary contributions that consumers provide.
Analogous neutrality and nonneutrality results to Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2007) are
obtained by Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2012) for the case in which the public good is provided
by a nonprofit firm instead of competitive firms. In all of this sequence of papers, relative price
effects and the nonconstant returns to scale play a crucial role. The implications that each of
these features (i.e., impact of relative prices and strictly concavity of transformation function)
has separately are not studied.
5 | MULTIPLE PUBLIC GOODS
The neutrality results for economies with a single public good apply to redistribution among
contributors such that no individual gives up an amount of income in excess of her initial
individual contribution level. This argument is very general, and applies equally to the cases of
identical preferences and heterogeneous preferences. The extension of the result to an economy
with multiple public goods is not immediate when preferences are heterogeneous.
When consumers have identical preferences the argument extends naturally if there are no
relative prices changes: the multiple public goods can be viewed as a single Hick’s aggregate and
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the model essentially collapses back to the single public good case. Kemp (1984) provided an
informal extension of Warr’s argument to the case of multiple public goods with heterogeneous
preferences by assuming away relative price changes. In contrast, Villanacci and Zenginobuz
(2007) show that relative price changes can eliminate neutrality. There is an additional
distinction between the single and multiple public good cases. With a single public good it is
possible to establish uniqueness of equilibrium. In contrast, with multiple public goods there is
a continuum of equilibria. The continuum arises because the private provision equilibrium
identifies the total amount of each public good that is provided but not the individual
contributions that make up the total.
The case of preference heterogeneity raises an additional issue since different consumers
potentially contribute to different subsets of the total set of public goods. If redistribution is
conducted within the group of contributors to a particular public good, then the same neutrality
argument applies as for a single public good. For redistribution among contributors to different
public goods, Cornes and Itaya (2010) show that neutrality holds if there are consumers that
provide links across the sets of contributors. With a single private commodity and two public
goods, A and B, the neutrality theorem of BBV holds if redistribution leaves unchanged the
aggregate income of the three following sets of agents: those who only contribute to A, those
who only contribute to B, and those who contribute to both A and B. To extend these results to
more than two public goods Cornes and Itaya (2010) define the following concepts:
Two individuals share an active interest in a public good A at an allocation if, at
that allocation, both individual’s marginal rates of substitution between that public
good and the private good equal the relative cost ratio q pA∕ , where qA is the unit
cost of producing A and p is the price of the single private good. Moreover,
individuals h and h k+ are linked if there exists a set of agents, indexed by k1, …, ,
and a set of public goods indexed by Aj, such that individuals h j+ − 1 and h j+
share an active interest in the public good Aj, for each j k{1, …, }∈ .
For example, if consumers 1 and 2 contribute to public good A, whereas 2 and 3 contribute to
public good B, then 2 links the contributor sets. Neutrality applies: If income is redistributed from 1 to
3, then 1 will reduce contribution to A, 2 will increase contribution to A and reduce that to B,
whereas 3 will increase contribution to B. Cornes and Itaya (2010) extend Theorem 7 in BBV and
show that an income redistribution that is restricted to a set of linked individuals, and that maintains
the links between them, has no effect on the original equilibrium allocation. This result is an example
of the general proposition of Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) that neutrality applies whenever there are
sufficient connections for the private sector to react in a way that undoes government actions.
More recently, in a context with multiple public and private goods, Faias et al. (2015)
consider redistribution of endowments that may involve all commodities and not only the
numeraire good. These redistributions are restricted to the set of consumers that contribute a
positive amount to each and every public good and who can be referred to as full contributors.
Assuming that public goods are produced by means of concave production functions, they
prove that neutrality still holds for redistributions among full contributors that allow each
consumer to get her initial equilibrium bundle of private goods. The proof of this result is
constructive, and uses an algorithm that is able to transfer the impact of endowment
reallocation into the individual private provision of public goods. To be precise, the first step
focuses on the agents whose value of endowment has decreased after the redistribution, and
defines for them new lower contributions given by the difference between the value of the new
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endowment and the value of equilibrium private consumption bundle. Analogously, in a second
step, those contributors for whom the value of the endowments has increased, increase their
contributions to public goods. In this way, one specifies new contributions such that the new
private provision sequentially fills in the gap between equilibrium provision and the lower
provision that may arise after the first step. By construction, under this mechanism, the
variation of the value of individual equilibrium contributions equals the value of the
endowment variation and neutrality is established.
To summarize, the aforementioned works lead us to argue that, to obtain neutrality results
addressing multiple public goods, it becomes crucial both to discern the properties of the
reallocation of resources and to identify the set of consumers among which the corresponding
redistribution takes place. The table recapitulates the results we have described in abbreviated form.
Production
function
Private
goods
Public
goods
Neutrality redistribution
requirements
Nonneutrality redistribution
requirements
Linear One One BBV (1986, Th. 1) BBV (1986, Th. 4)
Among contributors Between contributors and
noncontributors
Linear One Two BBV (1986, Th. 7)
Among contributors of the same
public good, and among contributors
to both
Linear One Multiple CI (2010, Prop. 4)
Among linked agent
Strictly
concave
Multiple One VZ (2007, Th. 5) and VZ (2012) VZ (2007, Th. 7 and Th. 8) and VZ
(2012, Th. 1)
Private numeraire good Private numeraire good
Among contributors Among noncontributors, and
between contributors and
noncontributors
Concave Multiple Multiple FMW (2015, Th. 4.1)
Private multiple goods
Among contributors to all public
goods
Abbreviations: BBV, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian; CI, Cornes and Itaya; FMW, Faias,
Moreno‐García, and Wooders; VZ, Villanacci and Zenginobuz.
6 | ALTRUISM, CONJECTURES, AND CUSTOMS
The private provision model has widespread application but that has not prevented discontent
about the model on the basis of the results that it generates. Boadway and Keen (2000) describe
the neutrality and inequality results as “apparently implausible” and use this motivation to
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justify exploration of modified versions of the model. This section reviews some of the
modifications and their implications for neutrality.
Individual private contributions to the provision of a public good can be thought of as an
example of altruistic behavior. Actually, in the related literature, the fact that someone
contributes without caring about their own contribution per se, has been referred to as pure
altruism3 and gives rise to research connecting public good provision and the degree of
altruism.
In this regard, there is an interesting reinterpretation of neutrality. As shown by Warr (1982)
and Roberts (1984), in the standard model with one private good and one public good,
government contributions to the public good financed by lump‐sum taxes will crowd out private
contributions dollar‐for‐dollar. This complete crowding‐out effect is related to the neutrality of
income redistribution by recasting it as a family of neutral tax increases and tax decreases.
Andreoni (1988) argues that this invariance proposition leads us to the paradox that an
exogenous change in gifts has no significant impact on the total provision of the public good.
To explain empirical observations on charitable giving, Andreoni (1989) develops a model in
which individuals contribute to public goods not only because they benefit directly from the
public good but also because they get some benefit from their gift per se (the warm glow effect).
The addition of this second, seemingly selfish reason for contributing, gives rise to impure
altruism and allows us to shed light on how the relative degrees of altruism matter.
Andreoni (1989) shows that a redistribution of income will increase the total supply of the
public good if and only if the person receiving the transfer is more altruistic than the person
losing income. If all individuals have purely altruistic preferences, then the redistribution will
be neutral. Thus, pure altruism is a sufficient condition for redistributions to have a neutral
effect on the amount of public good that is provided. However, pure altruism becomes a
necessary condition for the redistribution to have a neutral effect on all consumption, including
private goods. Further, Andreoni (1990) formalizes the application of the impure altruism
setting to charitable giving, and calibrates the model to measure the effects of possible policies.
The original BBV model of private provision has been generalized not only to multiple
private and public goods and to the consideration of impure altruism but also to further
scenarios that allow the deepening of neutrality results. For instance, Gradstein, Nitzan, and
Slutsky (1994) introduce incomplete information about income, which implies several
difficulties for demonstrating neutrality, and identify sufficient conditions for neutrality to
hold. Recently, Faias and Moreno‐García (2019) argue that, when analyzing the provision of
public goods, the distribution of the level of utilization may be significant. They consider
utilization as an additional variable, and extend the analyses of altruistic behavior, neutrality,
congestion, and other externalities that can be captured using this approach.
An alternative modification of the BBV model is to replace the Nash assumption with some
form of conjectural variation. Cornes and Sandler (1985) show that if the conjectural variation is
positive (meaning that every consumer expects an increase in the contributions of others in
response to an increase in own contribution) the equilibrium will have greater total public good
supply than the Nash equilibrium. Even though the level of provision changes, Dasgupta and
Itaya (1992) demonstrate that the neutrality result still remains valid for any constant
conjecture. Turning to nonconstant conjectures, Sugden (1985) argues that the only consistent
conjectures are negative, so that the equilibrium provision of the public good will be zero under
3A terminology that can be questioned since there is a private benefit arising from the increase in the total quantity of public good.
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reasonable assumptions. Moving to non‐Nash conjectures can therefore alter the equilibrium
level of the public good but does not necessarily eliminate the neutrality. Overall, the
conjectural approach is arbitrary given the good game‐theoretic motives for focusing upon the
Nash equilibrium. If the Nash equilibrium of the private provision economy does not agree with
observations, it would seem that the objectives of the households and the social rules they
observe should be reconsidered, not the conjectures they hold when maximizing.
The individualism embodied in the BBV model can be removed by modifying the rules of
social behavior. Sugden (1984) considers the principle of reciprocity by which each consumer
considers the contributions of others and contrasts them to what they feel they should make. If
the contributions of others match, or exceed, what is expected then the consumer obliged by the
social rule to make a similar contribution. Formalizing this notion, Sugden (1984) proves that
the outcome is Pareto efficient if all consumers agree upon the expected contributions. In all
other cases a Pareto improvement can be attained by increasing the supply of public good.
Bordignon (1990) has provided a formalization of Kantian behavior that leads to similar
conclusions. It has been shown experimentally (Chakravarty & Fonseca, 2017) that a sense of
social group identity can raise contributions to group‐specific public goods. A similar impact on
provision can be obtained if contributors can conduct coordinated punishment of
noncontributors, and this mechanism can function more effectively as group size increases
(Hwang, 2017).
7 | FINAL REMARKS
The work of Bergstrom et al. (1986) on the private provision of public goods has had a profound
impact on the public economics literature. This highly influential paper has proved to be an
inspiration for a large number of researchers. It has been influential in a wide range of topics in
economic theory, policy, and experiments. Moreover, the noncooperative approach to the
private provision of public goods pioneered by BBV has become a standard component of
graduate courses all over the world.
This paper has focused on neutrality theorems for private provision economies. We have
proved a version of the original BBV theorem and have discussed the extension of the result to
more general settings. The focus upon the neutrality result is justified because of the important
implications it has for the impact of redistributive policies. As we have noted, such policies will
be ineffective if they involve only the set of contributors, and policies that reduce income
inequality may actually cause social welfare to fall if they do not take into account the impact
on private provision. In addition, the logic of the neutrality result carries over into the
ineffectiveness of government provision of the public good due to complete crowding‐out. These
observations are significant for policy design and have merited empirical investigation of the
extent to which they apply in practice. The results in BBV have been an inspiration for many
subsequent papers, and many more papers inspired by BBV can be expected to follow.
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